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The establishment of English rule over Tangier sent a signal across Europe as to the global aspirations of the court of Charles II. On its purchase, the city was acclaimed as the fount of a novel maritime, commercial empire: an alternative to wasteful territorial conquests. Yet in 1684, Tangier was abandoned, its infrastructure crumbling and its reputation plunged into the domestic conflict aroused by fears of “popery and arbitrary government.” In Parliament, Tangier was damned as a place nurturing Catholic power and military excess: the lynchpin of a dangerous turn in Stuart foreign policy, should popish factions gain ascendancy at court. The English venture into the Mediterranean was once characterised as a colourful sideshow to Restoration politics. This article will argue that the experience is vital to understanding not merely the evolution of debates over empire but the interaction between imperial ambitions, domestic affairs and events on the European continent. Tangier fell because it had become a polarising element in national politics: the spearhead of an imperial vision that challenged traditional bonds and obligations towards continental allies and foreign Protestants with an alternative conception of the kingdom’s interest abroad. Examining the public controversy, together with the private exchanges of those caught up in the enterprise, this article will argue that the fall of English Tangier shows how the prospect of empire became not merely an arena for the projection of national anxieties, but an active agent shaping the moral, religious and ideological debates that destabilised the kingdom of Charles II. 

In 1702, a series of vituperative letters were dispatched from the clerical missionaries of Virginia to the Archbishop of Canterbury. Their target was Francis Nicholson, governor of the province and a veteran of English imperial service, and their complaints pointed to a local crisis of civil and religious relations. “We never had near so much Storm and Tempest, Tornados and Hurricanes as in this time. He governs us, as if we were a Company of Galley-Slaves,” complained one missionary.​[1]​ Nicholson was accused of running a licentious regime of arbitrary government, of harbouring Jacobite convictions and of strangling the growth of the Church with his preference for rule by the soldiery. These tastes were linked back by his detractors to the experiences of his early career, as a member of a regiment posted to the Straits of Gibraltar to serve in the English colonial city of Tangier. Here, he was “by the neighbourhood of the Moors, become so savage,” bemoaned another missionary, who claimed that Nicholson boasted of how, in Tangier, he had seen the way in which “the Emperour of Morocco governed the Moors,” and that according to this example, “he would beat us into obedience and let us know and feel yt he was Governor of Virginia.” From his formative imperial years, Nicholson was alleged to have acquired habits of cruelty, despotism and irreligion: traits that, so these clergymen feared, lingered still in the shadows of the English empire. If such methods persisted, the writer surmised that Virginia, its neighbouring colonies and “ye whole Empire of England” would “go the way of Tangier.”​[2]​
By raising the subject of Tangier, Nicholson’s assailants struck at a raw nerve: the period of English governance in the Mediterranean was an experience that most imperial advocates were desperate to eclipse. In 1684, the city had been abandoned by its governors, its garrison and its civilian population, with morale eroded by years of assaults from the Moroccan armies. The administrative buildings, the fortifications and the vast, unfinished harbour had been blown up by the Royal Navy, so that the assailants would be left with no prize of which to boast.​[3]​ So had ended a crown-funded experiment that had dwarfed the resources expended on the dominions in America, and yet, in sections of domestic opinion, came close to discrediting the entire project of the English overseas empire. Although the fate of Tangier occasioned over fifty published pamphlets or poems of lamentation, it left behind a reputation in which moral licence, tyranny, and disease were intertwined with the humiliation of military failure. The fortunes of the city were oft-cited as a cautionary tale in India as much as America, as a place where high national ambitions had dwindled into “all manner of villainy.”​[4]​ That an especially squalid and brutalising wing of Newgate gaol became known as “Tangier” into the eighteenth century neatly encapsulated the place it was beginning to hold in the collective national memory.​[5]​ 
After prolonged neglect by historians of empire, the rise and fall of English Tangier has been subject to a measure of scholarly recovery in recent years, its plight recaptured as part of an early imperial experience punctuated by strategic setbacks, territorial frayed edges and paths not taken. Linda Colley has located the collapse of the base within a pattern of encounters that laid bare the weakness of colonial settlements before local powers. The resurgence of Alouite Morocco as a regional force underlined “the scale of the disparity between Britain’s massive imperial pretensions on the one hand and its modest domestic size and resources on the other.”​[6]​ Tristan Stein has attributed the decline of Tangier to adverse trends in the political economy developed within the metropole, the effect of which was to leave the city caught between “competing models for the organization of overseas trade and empire.” The Navigation Acts of 1660 and 1663 locked Mediterranean merchants out of a “colonial system” orientated towards the Atlantic trade; concurrently, the levelling of uncompromising sovereign claims prevented Tangier from independent commercial development and flexible negotiation with Moroccan rulers.​[7]​ Less remarked upon is the fact that Tangier gave rise to one of the most vociferous public controversies to be kindled over the practise of Stuart imperialism, provoking a dispute that came to interrogate not just the strategic rationale of English foreign policy, but its moral and ideological foundations. Between November 1678 and January 1681, the city in the Straits was thrust centre stage in a political confrontation, as criticism of the court of Charles II mounted in the Westminster Parliament, centred on fears of the growth of “popery and arbitrary government” within the Stuart kingdoms. The opposition in the House of Commons refused to provide funds for the defence of Tangier unless Charles assented to their principal demand: the exclusion of James, duke of York from the royal succession. In and outside the chamber, the emergent Whig party justified its stance by pinpointing Tangier as a place where the “popish” influence was at its most deadly, with the city’s government in the hands of men who “confessed they are better lovers of France than their own King,” and whose conduct had left “his Majesty soe horribly abused & the nation dishonoured.”​[8]​ As the debate advanced, the opposition began to cast doubt on the entire validity of the plan that had raised Tangier to its totemic imperial status. Planting an English settlement in the Mediterranean was denounced for tilting the nation away from the really urgent call to arms, creating a fatal distraction from obligations towards Protestant allies in continental Europe, against the threat posed by Louis XIV. Antagonism towards Tangier was rapidly becoming an identifying banner to unite the king’s Whig opponents; support for the city was established, conversely, as one of the ideological building blocks of a loyalist, Tory manifesto. Parliamentary conflict wore away at imperial possibilities. By 1683, the failure to extract money for Tangier had eroded support within government ranks, and forced ministers to prepare the city for evacuation.
This article will examine the domestic reception of events in Tangier, retrieving from parliamentary records, pamphlets, and the correspondence of ministers and settlers the evolution of a debate that drew the city into larger questions of English politics, religion and foreign affairs. I will suggest that, while the prosperity of Tangier was greatly undermined by economic constraints and the technological sophistication of its Moroccan combatants, its fall can be understood only by exploring the symbiotic relationship between imperial outgrowth and shifts in domestic politics. Although recent historiography has fostered greater awareness of the transnational - and especially European - hinterland to Restoration affairs, the Stuart Empire is still too readily posited in a state of detachment from metropolitan contingencies. Scholarly discussion of Tangier characterises an existing focus on the long-term development of an intellectual, juridical and strategic architecture for English imperialism: less attention has been paid to the oscillating influence of affairs within the three kingdoms, and the impact of a rival set of pressures exerted from continental Europe.​[9]​ However, the practise of Stuart empire-building remained unsettled throughout the reign of Charles II, yet to be anchored on a stable political framework or commercial system comparable to that of Spanish America, and dangerously susceptible, therefore, to alterations in opinion at home.​[10]​ Exclusion from the Atlantic zone sealed off by the Navigation Acts did not mean that Tangier was cast to the political margins; indeed, through its possession, the commercial potential of the Mediterranean lodged itself sufficiently within visions of the English Empire to inform later acquisitions at the Treaty of Utrecht.​[11]​ Nor, by 1683, had relations with Moroccan rulers broken down so irretrievably as to forestall hopes of saving the city. Supporters and many critics professed that the decline of Tangier was not inevitable, that funds agreed in parliament would have provided the tools for its protection: where they differed was in perceiving the city as either a strategic prize or an ideological pollutant. The decisive factor in the collapse of Tangier was its induction into the anxieties rife over “popery and arbitrary government,” and the way in which it was located within the larger global context shaping English foreign and domestic policy. To a significant number of opponents, the cost of its keeping would have carried grave consequences for the direction of politics and religion in the British Isles and the European continent. 
In examining the controversy, this article will suggest, therefore, that concentration on the internal apparatus of empire risks overlooking the transformative impact of domestic divisions: in late Stuart England, the fortunes of precarious overseas settlements would be dictated by the cut and thrust of politics within an equally fragile metropole. The imperial ambitions of the court were proclaimed against a background of internal and international animosities: when, as Steve Pincus has highlighted, the peril of French “universal monarchy” heightened public discord over the appearance of Catholic and absolutist tendencies around the throne.​[12]​ The affairs of empire entered into the vocabulary of an English public sphere that, as Mark Knights has shown, was underlain by fears, caricatures, and invitations to partisanship, in which people, places, actions and events gathered polemical and divisive meaning.​[13]​ The opening section of the article will look at how possession of Tangier was promoted before the political nation in irenic terms, as the springboard for a new form of empire, breaking from unwelcome precedents in the ancient and contemporary worlds. I will then suggest that, behind the veil of this consensus, the city began to assume more partisan associations. A magnet for the aspirations of English and Irish Catholics, it nourished the worldview of those at court who wished to elevate the imperial destiny of the English state above its European, Protestant commitments. On this basis, I will show how the original consensus over Tangier fell apart, when challenges in the Mediterranean collided with the wave of instability created by the Exclusion Crisis, to force greater domestic scrutiny on the conduct of the English nation within the world. In examining the debate in the public arena, I will argue that Tangier represented more than simply a tableau upon which local anxieties could be projected. Conflict in the Mediterranean shaped the dynamics of the Exclusion Crisis: attitudes towards the policy that had sent English settlers into North Africa became potential determinants of domestic allegiance, since those judgements rested on rival, ideologically-tinted conceptions of the national interest. By the point of its collapse, the city had awakened a debate over the moral and religious meaning of the Stuarts’ pursuit of empire, which configured greater national dividing lines. This article will conclude by looking at the afterlife of Tangier, showing how the anxieties stirred in these debates echoed into contested ideas of the meaning and purpose behind the English imperial enterprise, beyond the reign of Charles II.  
I.
Forty years after its acquisition, Bishop Gilbert Burnet would recall Tangier as a place “then spoken of in the court in the highest strains of flattery,” adding that “such mighty things were said of it, as if it had been reserved for the King’s reign, to make it as glorious abroad, as it was happy at home.”​[14]​ Burnet was correct that a remarkable storehouse of hopes had been invested in a small city, never hitherto part of the English strategic imagination. The taking of Tangier capitalised on the moment of possibility created by the restoration of Charles II, when the mental maps crafted within the political nation appeared to be spilling out over the globe. “His Majesty hath an Imperial name,” declared one pamphleteer: “It was Charles that brought the Empire into France; Charles that brought it first into Spain: why should not Great Britain have his turn?”​[15]​ The clergyman John Beale put before the Royal Society a vision of the imperial greatness of the nation moving hand-in-hand with its commercial and intellectual mastery, when “richer treasures are swelling up for our King on the Tagus, and now both East and West Indies are pouring out their wealth,” while “the Spaniard (let it be so!) is growing pale, the Frenchman is trembling, wicked Rome lets her head droop.”​[16]​ The Restoration state declared itself on an imperial mission, with the establishment of councils for trade and foreign plantations, while renewed acts of navigation aimed to enrich the city of London as a two-way entrepot for global commodities. English ambitions were underpinned by continuing territorial outgrowth in North America, and the imperial statement of intent was made unequivocal when Charles II stunned European opinion by announcing the acquisition of Tangier and Bombay through marriage to the princess Catherine of Braganza, daring rival states and kingdoms - a wounded and enraged Spain especially - to defy him. 
Proclaimed a “royal city,” in an expedition raised from the king’s coffers, the taking of Tangier represented a departure from the common pattern by which English spheres of interest had been established outside Europe: a process characterised hitherto by private companies or individual proprietors operating under loose regal overview.​[17]​ In 1660, the main lobbying force for the taking of Tangier could be found within the Stuart court itself, as proponents of the Braganza match seized upon the rich geographical and economic significance of the purchase. Only three weeks sailing time from England, Tangier offered a foothold within “the greatest thoroughfare of commerce in the world,” when trade with Italian and Near Eastern ports had proliferated over half a century, and the vessels of the Levant Company were bearing silks and dyestuff, cotton, wine and short-wool, alongside an array of edible delicacies back into London.​[18]​ Local merchant expertise drew attention to the untapped potential of the Barbary coast as a resource for wax, hides and skins, oil and almonds, and the location of “the richest mines of silver in ye worlde.” Drawing off trade from the Spanish and Italian markets, Tangier could become the perfect hub for regional commodities, and, for the earl of Sandwich, “one of the fairest flowers” in the “garden” of Charles II.​[19]​ More ambitious advocates located the city as a centre that could command even larger oceanic trading networks. To the author of a Description of Tangier (1664), “this place stands very convenient to secure and advance the Indian trade,” as a base for returning vessels, and a marketplace to forge new commercial links between Asia and Africa.​[20]​ To Sir Hugh Cholmley, the former royalist soldier appointed surveyor of works in the city in 1664, possession of Tangier would enable English merchants to transmit American commodities through to the Levant, and so link the traffic of the Mediterranean and the northern Atlantic. The effect would be to “strengthen his Maties Dominions, & to unite them by being... mutually dependent on each other,” while luring in enough traders from Cadiz to break into “the riches from the Spanish Indies.”​[21]​ It was on these grounds that Samuel Pepys identified Tangier as “the most considerable place the King of England hath in the world,” with a promise that far outstripped the offerings of Bombay, “a poor little island,” eventually resettled in 1667 into the hands of the East India Company.​[22]​ 
The strategic implications of the new bequest generated scarcely less excitement and apprehension. Tangier took the English state into a zone characterised, historically and contemporaneously, by confrontations between rival empires, and the playing out of religious and ideological enmity. “The Spanyard will indeavour what he can by stratagems to gayne the place, knowing how pjudiciall it will be to have such a powerful Enimy to be so neare a neighbour. Nay, it doth vex the Turks, Hollanders and French,” anticipated a report submitted to the earl of Clarendon in 1661.​[23]​ By forging a powerbase in the Mediterranean, Charles II could, it was argued, impose a permanent stranglehold on Spanish regional ambitions.​[24]​ Alternative confrontations carried equally dramatic potential. Within the Straits of Gibraltar, Christian Europe was being brought face to face with forces of the Crescent, when corsairs linked intermittently to the regional powers of Algiers, Tripoli and Tunis levied a rising toll on passing merchant fleets. Over the course of the century, an estimated 20,000 English subjects languished in Barbary prison cells.​[25]​ The widely-publicised perils of captivity in the Mediterranean heightened a national consciousness of the embattled condition of Christendom, at a time when Turkish forces were pushing westwards into central Europe. Antagonism towards Islam had not been a constant or central feature of the confessional worldview in Stuart England: the greater visibility of divisions within Christian Europe had deterred the clergy from embracing campaigns for the Cross raised by Venetian, Austrian or Spanish leaders.​[26]​ Yet by the middle of the seventeenth-century, when Crete, parts of Transylvania and southern Ukraine had fallen under the control of the Koprulu viziers, Protestant reticence was falling away. As Tony Claydon has shown, consciousness of the Turkish peril was embedded within the polemical vocabulary generated by a disparate set of foreign policy debates.​[27]​ In European diplomacy, Tangier was positioned from the point of its acquisition within the context of a religious war. When possession of the city enabled the English to strike against Ottoman vessels and their Barbary allies, European princes would, Charles II informed the Austrian ambassador, prove themselves “not only bad Allies, but bad Christians also, if they countenance any further attempts of the Moors upon us there.”​[28]​
The public commentaries that brought Tangier into the domestic realm were therefore gripped by the paradox of how possession of a small spot of land could carry global ramifications, enabling a king to emerge as “Master of the Mediterranean Sea,” and in placing “what Conditions you Pleased upon all ye World, that passe through ye Streights,” so “give Laws to Europe and Africa,” and establish “at a mighty rate, the foundation of a new empire.”​[29]​ These reflections transplanted onto a new region debates that had ensued over the safety of the Baltic trade throughout the previous decade, when the threat of rival powers closing off access to the seaways had raised anxiety within the Cromwellian Council of State.​[30]​ Over half a century, English imperial encomiasts had been positing the notion of an oceanic trading empire as an alternative to seizing “vast Emenities of the Earth,” in the words of the jurist Charles Molloy.​[31]​ Hugh Cholmley had observed the contrast between “the large and poor territories of Spain,” and the “narrow confinements of the United Provinces,” from whose example, he said, “we are plainly taught, that the happiness and power of a nation does not consist in much land, but in much money and riches.”​[32]​ Perceiving an island nation ill-equipped for territorial expansion, Molloy cited the Genovese and Venetian “marts of the world ... store-houses of all those Merchandizes that may be Collected from the rising to the setting of the Sun,” as precedents for a different form of dominion.​[33]​ Both authors recalled the arguments of Thomas Mun, whose anticipation of England’s Treasure by Forraign Trade was reprinted in 1664 at the behest of Sir Henry Bennett on the Privy Council, and who had believed that the imposition of “Spanish slavery” upon Mexico and Peru had led only to a wasteful and exhausted dominion, hollowed-out by the “canker of war.”​[34]​ Mun’s disciples sketched out the opposing picture of an empire attained not through costly territorial advancement but by the seizure of ports, peninsulas and isthmuses equipped to act as safe harbours for a kingdom’s navy, and magnets for its merchants. For Henry Sheres, the engineer who would succeed Cholmley as surveyor of works in 1675, the wise monarch would seek not physical possession of the globe but perfect knowledge of its peoples, commodities and maritime trading routes, when Baconian methods of computation and calculation opened up the “untrodden path” towards lasting national power.​[35]​ The seizure of Tangier would affirm therefore the imperial adage expressed by John Evelyn, that whoever controlled the oceans possessed the keys to “the world itself.”​[36]​
The significance of this diagnosis was that the conception of empire in Restoration England was tinged with ambivalence. While the nation’s colonial experience in America had relied haphazardly on private initiative rather than royal funds, the English discourse of empire was, as David Armitage has shown, built upon a Renaissance lineage of texts that warned against the dangers of territorial imperialism, citing the descent of Rome into despotism, luxury and eventual collapse.​[37]​ The contemporary associations were scarcely more appetising, when the image of empire was most readily associated with the Catholic would-be “universal monarchies” of Europe, “whose footsteps,” as Charles Molloy put it, “leave behind them... misery, devaluation and poverty.”​[38]​ A ready genre of plays, poems and travel literature kept alive the “black legend” of Spanish atrocities against the native peoples of Central America. A new translation of Las Casas’s Account of the Destruction of the Indies had emerged in 1656, followed by William Davenant’s dramatisation of the Cruelty of the Spaniards in Peru, produced to mobilise moral fervour for the Cromwellian assault upon the Caribbean.​[39]​ The reaction against “universal monarchy” echoed too into English merchant critiques of Dutch operations in the East Indies, where Sir Thomas Roe had adjudged that “warr and traffique are incompatible” and “Plantation here by the Swoord” could never achieve enduring success.​[40]​ Sir Paul Rycaut, ambassador to the Turks, used his account of the Ottoman Empire to opine that it was nobler for a nation to “live within our own borders” than experience the “honour of being slaves to the lusts of a Monarch, whose titles comprehend the greatest part of the World,” and a welter of Protestant moral objections appeared in the writings of Richard Baxter, who perceived West Indian plagues and hurricanes as the verdict from heaven upon Caribbean planters and slave-dealers emulating the sins of the conquistadors.​[41]​ 
The settlement of Tangier was therefore being introduced to domestic opinion through the medium of a larger manifesto for empire that made a cosmopolitan virtue of the decentralised and often disordered way in which English interests were implanted overseas. In charting the rise and fall of this ideology, Alison Games has seen the expedition to Tangier as the beginning of a decisive break towards imperial initiatives charted by crown diktat, and imposed by armed force.​[42]​ Yet, in its initial decade at least, the vision enunciated for the city proved the resilience of an imperial model grounded on notions of commerce and civility rather than military hardware. English activity in the Straits was positioned as a complete alternative to all the unsavoury associations that clung to the image of European imperialism. The ambition to open up the “inland trade into Africa” inclined English strategists towards accommodation with their new Moroccan neighbours, whom Sandwich envisaged as allies against Spain, and whose contact was coveted by correspondents from the Royal Society, as the point of access to scholarly wisdom deemed “wanting in Christendom.”​[43]​ Accordingly, in English commentaries, most of the initial reflections upon Tangier resisted the confessional call to arms against an Islamic enemy.​[44]​ Hugh Cholmley framed a distinction between the disposition of Charles II and the designs of the aspiring universal monarchs on the continent, predicting peace and commerce with Barbary on the premise that its inhabitants knew “our King only desires Tangers for the Port whilst ye French they think would endeavour a Conquest of the Countrey.”​[45]​ The city chaplain Lancelot Addison used his account of West Barbary (1671) to damn the “Pedantick Vanities” of Greek scholarship for blinding the world to virtues visible among the Moors. These, he averred, should induce the reader “to think, that what is commonly call’d Barbarous, is but a different Mode of Civility.”​[46]​ The image retailed for English Tangier was becoming cogent enough to gain support even from mercantile commentators such as Roger Coke, normally hostile towards lavishing national hopes and fiscal resources on distant overseas outposts.​[47]​ The novelty of an empire attained through peace, friendship and an international web of trade conferred potency upon events in the Mediterranean that transcended narrowly strategic hopes. Henry Sheres believed that a commercially-minded English imperialism had become the “mighty machine” whose “Wheels and motions” drove forward material and intellectual advancement, without which “our Fleeces might grow till they Rot, and our Mines remain in the bowels of their Mother; and our People rust into the Barbarity of their Ancestors...”​[48]​ Increasingly, ideals fostered in London entered into the correspondence of the merchant notables taking up office in the city. As John Bland, a future mayor of the city, informed Samuel Pepys in 1665, “Nothing can be of greater service to the King than to make Tangiers famous.”​[49]​

II.
Within a year of its purchase, the representation of Tangier was becoming freighted with high aspirations: hopes that drove forward the development of a major civil and military infrastructure in the Straits of Gibraltar. By 1676, Tangier was absorbing an average of £75,000 every year, more than Charles II spent on all his other overseas outposts, or all his home garrisons put together.​[50]​ The city possessed a 4,000-strong occupation force, and Sir Hugh Cholmley was setting about the construction of the mole, a vast harbour built onto the natural shoreline, lined with cannons and defensive fortifications to provide shelter for visiting vessels.​[51]​ Cholmley’s successor Henry Sheres was convinced that the edifice could outmatch “the building of St. Paul’s” as a feat of public architecture conceived to raise the prestige of the English nation.​[52]​ The court abided still by the older English vision of empire wrought not “under a martiall power,” but, as Hugh Cholmley perceived it, through “rules and orders... necessary to ye well being of man kinde.”​[53]​ The endowment of churches, libraries and theatres proclaimed the intention of planting civic life; in 1669, the king endorsed the introduction of a mayor, aldermen and common council, in a structure of self-governance conceived to mirror the City of London.​[54]​ The earl of Peterborough pledged as governor that Tangier would remain free of soldierly “intermeddling,” and extend hospitality to “such as shall come hither to Trade or Traffique,” to safeguard “the good and wholesome Lawes by this Nation already established.”​[55]​ Such assurances heightened the reputation of Tangier across the wider reaches of the king’s dominions, and attracted a stream of settlers from America and the Caribbean.​[56]​ After Charles II waived commercial duties on imports for five years, the councils of New York and Barbados cited the precedent as a template for restructuring the empire around the principle of free ports and buoyant trade.​[57]​ If it was physically at a remove from the rest of the Stuarts’ dominions, Tangier was far from peripheral to the English imperial imagination.
However, while the taking of the city was proclaimed as a moment of unifying patriotism, the worldview that raised Tangier as a paramount national interest posed a challenge to other principles and practises in English foreign policy that had developed over half a century. Intervention in the Mediterranean could be justified in atavistic Elizabethan terms as an assault upon “popish” Spain, but the same strategy was anchored upon alliance with another Catholic power, the newly-independent kingdom of Portugal, and its effect was push the court of Charles II into a world distinctly foreign to English Protestant culture. The Stuart monarchy sought at once to stand as protector of its new ally, and to inherit control over her old spheres of interest outside Europe, on an agreement as Lord Clarendon put it, that “whatever Townes or Islands shall be taken by the English... though heretofore belonging to the Portugall, shall remaine to the Crown of England.”​[58]​ The Portuguese alliance entailed induction into the nuances of intramural Catholic diplomacy: Charles II and his queen established envoys in Rome, to push for recognition of the ecclesiastical rights of the house of Braganza, and the negotiations over Tangier - conducted secretly away from Spanish eyes - proceeded with the assistance of an English émigré priest, Richard Russell, as chaplain to Queen Catherine.​[59]​ The final confirmation of English rule over the city rested on promises of concessions to the resident communities of Catholic merchants and clergymen; as late as May 1661, Portuguese negotiators were demanding that the principal office-holding posts be occupied by men of their own religion.​[60]​ Some of the strongest advocates for Tangier could be found among the Mediterranean communities of English and Irish Catholic merchants who had lobbied to gain licenses within the Spanish and Portuguese maritime empires.​[61]​ Francis Bedingfield, Richard Fitzgerald and Charles Russell all offered their expertise to show how Tangier could draw commerce away from Cadiz, while priests in the exiled national colleges at Seville, Lisbon and Valladolid acted as eyes and ears for naval officers anxious for information on manoeuvres within the Iberian kingdoms.​[62]​ Even attempts to secure the liberation of English captives held on the Barbary Coast required collaboration between civic authorities in Tangier and the Portuguese clerical orders: the Redemptorists had developed particular experience in ransom negotiations.​[63]​ The pursuit of the Braganza match had coloured the margins of English diplomacy with a distinctly Catholic tinge. In a delicate acknowledgement of the potential problems, Clarendon placed his faith in a mood of imperial triumphalism to “dispose the whole Nation to a liking of this Allyance, against many objections which can be enough foreseen.”​[64]​
When the goal of a Mediterranean Empire was pursued in the face of potential international opposition, the possession of Tangier required English ministers to recalibrate diplomatic relationships, in ways that could prove highly contentious. The purchase of the city was repeatedly invoked to justify the sale of Dunkirk to Louis XIV in 1661: in a symbolic indication of court priorities, its early funding was drawn out of re-minted French coinage.​[65]​ Yet this act threatened to overturn received wisdom that England’s safety depended upon the retention of a “counterscarp” on the continent, to facilitate active military interventions, and resist the domination of Europe by any single monarch.​[66]​ Hugh Cholmley submitted the challenge overtly, contending that a maritime, commercial understanding of the national interest cleaved not merely away from the territorial model of empire typified in Spanish America, but against expensive forays into Europe. “It will be found,” he argued, “that England was never so much exhausted as when our ancestors raised so many trophies to their victories in France; all of which has since been lost, with more happiness, I think, to the interest of an Englishman, than it was ever gained...”​[67]​ The conviction, advanced within the royal council, was that an acceptance of rising French ambitions in Western Europe represented the only way to offset the danger of Bourbon opposition towards the purchase of Tangier itself.​[68]​ However, advocates for Tangier went further, to argue that possession of the city would enable Charles II to accommodate himself, untroubled, to rising French power, secure in the knowledge that the Mediterranean was a prize more consequential than any territory Louis XIV might engross on the continent. Sir William Temple confirmed the fear current in other European capitals that amity between Charles II and Louis XIV would enable England to “enjoy the pleasures of Spain and the riches of the Indies” undisturbed by European rivalry.​[69]​ Even after its fall, the political economist Sir William Petty defended the rationale behind English rule over Tangier as part of a project to neutralise the Bourbon monarchy. If the English could control the commerce of the Straits, “they need not care what the French get at Land, which they want not.”​[70]​
The same mollifying spirit was not in evidence towards the United Provinces. In 1661, Clarendon concluded that the “straightened” condition of “the King of Portugall’s Dominions & Power” outside Europe had created a vacuum from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, which would draw the English into a new phase of competition with their Protestant commercial rivals.​[71]​ The corollary to the Braganza match acquisitions would lead, Hugh Cholmley concurred, to “commotions,” between Whitehall and The Hague.​[72]​ On this assumption, English maritime strategies in the Mediterranean became more bellicose. The earl of Sandwich spelt out one of the prime goals of governance over Tangier as a bid to “rob ye Hollanders, our mortall enemy, of a great income, a business of no small consideration”; the merchant James Wilson argued that the growth of English hegemony over the Mediterranean would serve to “cut them off from Cadiz” and its markets.​[73]​ Within months of its purchase, Tangier had therefore become crucial to the ambitions of a faction in court and council, associated especially with the duke of York, who were advocating military struggle with the Dutch in order to attain the “sovereignty of the seas.”​[74]​ In 1664, a report from Tangier informed Clarendon that “the Dutch war is much talked of and desired in these parts,” as a chance for Tangier to prove its mettle in furnishing a naval base that would “bring terror to all the Princes in Christendome.”​[75]​ Eight years later, one of the city’s commanders, Colonel John Fitzgerald, was considered as a candidate to lead a land assault on the Netherlands, when hostilities escalated once again.​[76]​ In 1670, Lord Treasurer Thomas Clifford placed the goal of dominance over the Mediterranean within the sweeping, secret manifesto drawn up in advance of the Treaty of Dover, outlining his vision of a sea-borne empire, a permanent Anglo-French alliance directed against the United Provinces, and the integration of Charles II’s kingdoms back into a Catholic Church purged of Spanish interests.​[77]​ Though its acquisition had been promoted as a moment of glorious national consensus, English rule over Tangier was becoming harnessed to an intensely divisive diplomatic agenda.
III.
The ambitions voiced for Tangier remained embedded in the imperial calculations of the Stuart court: Henry Sheres was gratified to discover the king and duke of York in 1676 as the most outspoken advocates for the city in Whitehall.​[78]​ The investment placed heavy pressure upon Tangier to fulfil expectations, and reach a self-sustaining level of prosperity. Increasingly, these hopes failed to materialise. The most visible challenge to the city emanated from an array of external threats. Harried at sea by corsairs and Dutch fleets, the garrison struggled to repel the barbs delivered on land by the feuding warlords of the Barbary coast.​[79]​ Refusing to believe English assurances that the settlers sought only “good correspondency and commerce,” Barbary magnates were at best reticent at entering into trading relations with the city.​[80]​ At worst, English expectations that the “effeminate Moors” had been softened by vice and luxury were to be confounded in a series of crushing military encounters.​[81]​ The second governor, Andrew Rutherford, earl of Teviot, was killed alongside 400 comrades in a Moorish ambush in 1664. Between 1677 and 1682, war with the neighbouring Regency of Algiers cost 160 merchant ships, goods worth at least £800,000, and the loss of a further 3,000 English subjects into captivity.​[82]​ By 1678, the Alouite rulers were re-establishing their powerbase in Morocco, suppressing regional challenges and driving the Spanish out of their remaining Barbary outposts. Under the leadership of Moulay Ismail es-Samin, the centralisation of the territory carried explicitly expansionist goals, and a willingness to invoke the rhetoric of holy war to call subject peoples into the field.​[83]​ “No more the ignorant and unskilful neighbours they were to the Portuguese,” the Moroccans had, Samuel Pepys warned, grown to “a great degree of knowledge in the business of war.”​[84]​ But it was not just the robustness of the enemy that alarmed commentators reporting on the state of Tangier. Funds and victuals frequently failed to arrive, the available building materials proved inadequate defences against the storms that struck the Straits, and medical resources were insufficient to deal with the diseases that snaked through the settler population.​[85]​ With the construction of harbour and fortifications threatening to flounder, Hugh Cholmley was forced to invest sums drawn privately from City bankers, “plunging my selfe into great debts to procure moneys for soe vast a charge”.​[86]​ By 1667, he feared that the scale of the investment needed at Tangier was suited only to more “plentifull & larger monarkys and not to those whose business is in the first place to narrow their expenses”; one of the city’s physicians lamented that events in Mediterranean showed how England could never hope to match “the greatness of the king of France.”​[87]​ 
Disease, expense and regional enmity ensured that Tangier’s capacity to incarnate a new form of imperial virtue would be severely tested. It was in this context, as Tristan Stein has show, that the enervating effects of lack of trade began to impinge, when the logic of the Navigation Acts was to prevent the city being incorporated into the Atlantic networks driving English global commerce.​[88]​ Within Tangier itself, this complaint was less persistent than the frustration voiced over failures to break into the commercial web of the Mediterranean. While the 1670 Treaty of Madrid had stabilised Anglo-Spanish relations, Tangier merchants were continually obstructed from access to the ports of Andalusia, and denied the chance to purchase building materials deemed essential for the city’s development.​[89]​ With the dream of bringing together the fruits of four continents failing to materialise, Tangier threatened to appear less a burgeoning free port than “a little camp trading in drink,” as Hugh Cholmley came to fear.​[90]​ These constraints placed pressure upon the model of the limited, commercial empire that had legitimised the taking of the city. Stifled in their hopes of enrichment, many of the city’s officers began to draft a new prospectus for the growth of Tangier, not as a peaceful emporium, but as a seat of conquest and expansion.​[91]​ Belying the cosmopolitan tone struck by the original diplomatic overtures towards Morocco, certain confrontational impulses had run through English strategic plans soon after the inception of rule in the Mediterranean. The earl of Sandwich believed that the “distracted condition” of the Barbary Coast, under its competing princes, could enable imperial forces to strike a course south-west into the North African interior, and assume mastery over the many Moorish towns that “will naturally fall into our hands.”​[92]​ An expansionist vision had been spelt out in florid detail by the merchant James Wilson, who impressed the duke of York with a manifesto for “the conquest of Barbary” through a programme of Anglo-Scottish settlement, modelled on the plantations of Ireland and America and eventually stretching far across the continent to meet the English trading factories on the River Gambia.​[93]​ While, the court was swiftly disabused of the practicality of this plan, the failure to establish secure relations with its neighbours ushered more hard-edged visions for Tangier closer to the strategic mainstream. By 1667, Hugh Cholmley concluded that it was only by establishing a “considerable collony” to command its wider environs that the city might “stand upon its own legs as neere as may be,” when “a peace to any purpose is impossible with Men absolutely Barbarous.”​[94]​ Henry Sheres took to court his conviction that a new policy, centred on “warr with these Infidells,” and the seizure of the Atlas silver mines, represented the surest route to prosperity.​[95]​ Powered by bullion, and underpinned by an ethos of militant religion, an empire centred on Tangier would, on this understanding, be an empire refigured, not as the antithesis to Spanish America, but its superior emulation.
Yet while the advocates for Tangier cast their eyes towards further acquisitions, their sentiments came into conflict with an alternative line of argument, expressed both in England and the Mediterranean, which linked the ills of the city to maladies deep-seated within its own internal governance. Within a decade of its possession, Tangier was beginning to acquire the reputation that would bedevil it for generations, as something of a moral wasteland. “The number of our Soldiers is few, but of Fighting Men much less, many being superannuated, but more disabled by Debauchery,” complained one inhabitant in public print.​[96]​ Venturing to the Mediterranean in 1683, Samuel Pepys would see “Nothing but vice in the whole place of all sorts, for swearing, cursing, drinking and whoring... everything runs to corruption here.”​[97]​ Behind many of these reports lay the tension between the civilian and the military wings of the city, and persistent accusations from the merchant community that officers had assumed unchecked levels of power, eroding the “rules, orders and institutions” designed to protect commercial life. Installed as governor in May 1667, Henry Norwood lamented that “nothing has more retarded the improvement of Tangier” than military grandees “arriving with their owne creatures” to assume “an arbitrary power over every man’s possession, [which] doe greatly discourage ye habitants to doe anything tending to a settlement of their familyes on the place...”​[98]​ Nine years later, Henry Sheres perceived no improvement, fuming that in the long gaps between the appointment of successive governors, “people hath done as mutinous and as arbitrary things as if they had not the Civill Lawes and the Law of England for their Government, but the martial.”​[99]​ Dissidents from within the city appeared repeatedly in London to present their complaints before the commissioners on the Council of Trade, and accused in particular the later governors, the earl of Inchiquin and Percy Kirke, of undermining the judges and aldermen, gaoling their critics and treating their own soldiers with such casual brutality as to prompt mutinies and desertions.​[100]​ Later, in his memoirs, Sir Hugh Cholmley would regret that “the consideration of what be for the good and improvement of Tangier came but little into the minds of men who abhorred the thoughts of living long there.” Indeed, for too many of the settlers, Tangier had become “an ill prison, from which they could only hope to be freed by a grave.”​[101]​ 
The final component of the emerging critique of Tangier was even more serious, since it exposed conflicting interpretations of the policies that could be lawfully enacted within an English overseas dominion. Within a decade of its purchase, dissident voices inside the city had begun to complain that Tangier was opening up an avenue for English, Irish and Scottish Catholics to rise through public office, in a manner unthinkable under the gaze of parliament. When Charles II had used commissions in Tangier as a chance to reward ex-royalist soldiers, it was reported by 1666 that half of the serving officers were Catholic; Hugh Cholmley explicitly saw the city as an opportunity to draw his own recusant kinsman back from French or Spanish regiments into service of the English crown.​[102]​ But the influence was detected growing equally in the civil estate. One merchant alleged in 1667 that Catholic office-holders in the courts of justice had proved “factious in deciding causes in favour of their relligion”; thirteen years later, John Bland claimed that three of the six alderman were “professed papists,” the new mayor “more popish than Protestant” while the composition of the garrison was dangerously and disproportionately Irish.​[103]​ Lancelot Addison, protested to the archbishop of Canterbury about priests rife within the city, “busying themselves to seduce... the soldiers & youth of the place uppon payne of hell & damnation.”​[104]​ Moreover, Catholic promotion appeared to be driven quite self-consciously as court policy. Two of the first three governors - Teviot and John, Lord Belasyse - subscribed to the religion, as did the Irish soldier Thomas Dongan, appointed lieutenant-governor in 1678.​[105]​ In 1669, the embassy to Morocco, co-ordinated from Tangier, was fronted by another Catholic, Lord Henry Howard.​[106]​ English rule in the Straits had given exposure to an unresolved tension in the legal architecture of the empire, as the court fostered confessional arrangements in its colonies that diverged from the statuary framework maintained within the metropole. Tangier, had been founded - in line with Stuart policy towards the American provinces - on a principle of toleration, with its governors instructed to “connive at the Roman Catholique Worshipp, for ye Satisfaction of those that shall be of the profession, as allsoe at a Synagogue for the Jewes in case they desire it...”​[107]​ Hugh Cholmley believed that there could be “no reason” for a Catholic conscience to prohibit men of proven loyalty from “a Commission, wch doth chiefly relate to ye building a Citty in Affrica.”​[108]​ The careers of many of the city’s officers highlighted the scope of the empire as an arena for Catholics to enter into public office. James Bellings, brother to Queen Catherine’s secretary, moved in regimental colours from Tangier to the Leeward Islands, while Thomas Dongan’s stint in the Mediterranean proved the training ground for his appointment as governor of New York in 1682.​[109]​ But the rise of Catholic governors and Irish soldiers brought the most visible indication that Tangier existed in a dangerously separate jurisdiction. Put together with the other ills afflicting the city, these tensions offered ready material to stir a domestic critique.

IV.
As the hopes voiced over Tangier had filtered into a wider English political consciousness, so the reports of its decline spread rapidly out of the Mediterranean. Soon, as Hugh Cholmley lamented, “the sufferings the poor soldiers endured, gave so bad impressions of the place among the commons of England,” as to sap at the image of the city.​[110]​ In 1667, the Council of Trade was alerted to disorder in the Devon coastal ports, raised by reports of press-gangs operating, “giving out that we are Papists, and trapanners of poor people for Tangiers.”​[111]​ From the court, Samuel Pepys bemoaned to Sheres that “wrangleings and factions” had started to undermine the consensus in favour of the colony; on a lobbying venture to in 1671, the city chaplain, John Luke witnessed heated debates splitting the Council of Trade, with growing scepticism towards Tangier declared by Prince Rupert and Anthony Ashley Cooper.​[112]​ Court tensions failed to abate over the decade. In 1679, the Tory MP Sir John Reresby found the royal entourage convulsed by arguments about responsibility for the decline of the city, with the king so disgusted that he refused to allow the returning governor, Lord Inchiquin, to kiss the royal hand.​[113]​ The real anxiety in Whitehall, however, arose over the matter of how the court might “give some account of it to the world,” as the earl of Sunderland demanded, and in particular to Parliament, “where all such miscarriages would probably be examined.”​[114]​ The council was right to be fearful. 
The image of a tottering city, an undermanned garrisoned and debauched colonists set to be massacred in a distant outpost was damaging enough, but the fatal blow for Tangier was struck when it began to be discussed not simply on its own demerits, but incorporated into a context of developing political instability in England, Scotland and Ireland. While military fortunes in the Mediterranean faltered, a relentless public campaign was stirring the domestic political nation into an obsession with the dangers of “popery and arbitrary government,” with a self-proclaimed “Country Party” in parliament tearing into the Francophile, pro-Catholic or autocratic tendencies detected in the royal councils.​[115]​ Opposition factions mounted resistance to the renewal of conflict with the United Provinces in 1673, agitated against the growth of the standing army, and demolished the court plan to extend liberty of conscience to Roman Catholics, to pass instead the Test Act, placing the principle of religious exclusion on a firmer statutory foundation. As early as 1669, Tangier had fallen under the lens of the court’s critics: as a gift to Charles II from a foreign power, the city was set outside the writ of English laws, according to the MP Sir Thomas Lee, so that a man falling foul of the authorities “never know what his crimes are, and no Habeas Corpus can reach him.”​[116]​ Over the coming decade, the claim that “the law of Tangier” had diverged from the juridical customs of England would reappear in and outside parliament, framing a case that the city was not merely being mismanaged, but governed in a way that carried pernicious implications for subjects at home.​[117]​ Sir Richard Temple was moved in 1673 to demand full parliamentary annexation, for “if we have value for our liberties, we would secure them by Law.”​[118]​ Henry Savile’s “Advice to a Painter to Draw the Duke By” took aim at Peterborough, Belassis and John Fitzgerald as agents of a gathering popish conspiracy against the realm.​[119]​ Two years later, the confirmation of the city as a casus belli for the Country party was affirmed when John Bland, the disaffected former mayor, delivered to the earl of Shaftesbury a vehement depiction of civil and moral malaise, which he developed subsequently in an anonymous pamphlet, The Present Interest of Tangiers. Settlers had sought only “to fill their purses, and then to return for England with their Gains,” Bland declared. Relationships with the Moors had been characterised by “bigotry” and belligerence: “we have never sent any to understand their Country... to examine their Interest, their inclinations, and those other things which we might improve to the advantage of Tangier.” Governors had “made it their business to ruine the Protestant Interest,” and raised up a swarm of “popish friars”, that “they might by the means of their Absolutions enjoy their Vices and filthiness without remorse of Conscience.”​[120]​ Bland concluded that the colony would soon be drained of all inhabitants, unless “we may understand the true causes of the Peoples aversion for Tangier, and be able to remove them for the future.”​[121]​ In his judgement, the decline of the base was rooted in its internal moral character: ‘Let profane men think what they will, there was never yet a Citie or a Nation that ever prosper’d since the beginning of the World that slighted the Religion of its Countrie’.​[122]​
The tensions stirred by Bland burst onto the public stage in England in November 1679, in a confrontation that brought the domestic, European and imperial dimensions to British politics together in explosive conjunction. In North Africa, Moulay Ismail had now become, “absolute master of all Barbary and therefore the more harder to be drawn to any termes,” as the English lieutenant-governor Sir Palmes Fairborne reported.  Amassing outside the walls of Tangier, his troops were proving themselves proficient in “ye skill of mineing, Intrenching, & Great Guns.”​[123]​ In England, political and religious suspicions had finally burst out into the furore of the “popish plot” allegations, and provoked the start of the Exclusion Crisis, as the earl of Shaftesbury rallied the newly-formed Whig party on an undertaking to remove James, duke of York from the line of succession. Affairs within the Mediterranean represented one of the potent factors shaping the terms of the parliamentary battleground. It was in Tangier in 1675 that Titus Oates claimed to have heard the first whispers of a Catholic plot against the life of Charles II.​[124]​ It was the need to salvage the city, so Fairborne was assured by English correspondents in 1678, which had informed the king’s decision to call a parliament.​[125]​ Throughout the clash over the Exclusion Bill, Charles II repeatedly brought Tangier to the forefront of his public interventions: proposing that the base be fully “United to the Imperiall Crown,” with a guaranteed foundation of parliamentary funding.​[126]​ The king’s motive was in part tactical: raising up the defence of the empire to demand that domestic political differences be laid aside. But its effect instead was to produce a thorough interrogation of the state of English interests overseas, in which, as the secretary of state Leoline Jenkins warned authorities in the Straits, “the Parliament was not at all kinde to Tanger.”​[127]​ To one MP, Silus Titus, the court’s attempts to elevate Tangier to a major concern of state served only to make Englishmen act, “like Nero, when Rome was on fire, to fiddle.”​[128]​ Sir Thomas Player advanced that his fellow London merchants would “not give a penny for Tangier” until the Protestant religion “be secured,” for “they have felt the effects of the Papists by the Fire” of 1666.​[129]​ 
Committing their thoughts to a parliamentary resolution in June 1680, opposition leaders went further, and indicted Tangier not simply for diverting minds from the anti-popish drama, but as the definitive embodiment of the wrong turn taken in English politics: “one result also of the same Counsels and Designs which have brought Your Majesties ... Kingdoms into those great and imminent Dangers.”​[130]​ It was in Tangier, a “seminary for priests,” and a garrison “full of the duke’s creatures,” that the reality of a corrupted court agenda had been opened up to the world, when Catholics had gained powers and privileges that mocked the authority of a Protestant realm.​[131]​ It was on this basis that parliament justified its order for the arrest of the secretary of state Sir Joseph Williamson.​[132]​ By October 1680, and the opening of the second Exclusionist Parliament, a critique of the city had become one of the unifying bonds welding together the Whig faction. As Lord Russell concluded: “Tangier is in ill hands, in the hands of Popery. All our miseries are founded upon Popery...”​[133]​ Both houses refused to grant the king his requested supply.​[134]​
As the opposition probed the calculations of court and council, it was not just the extent of the depredations within Tangier, but the essential position of the city within the architecture of English foreign policy that began to fall under scrutiny. John Bland had evinced no doubts that Tangier remained a “jewell” that “most European potentates covet”: a process of Protestant cleansing and renovation would bring the place back to its original calling.​[135]​ But an increasing number of voices in Westminster began to contemplate whether it was in the interests of the kingdom to retain it at all. The City Alderman William Love doubted that any kingdom would benefit from Tangier, “for it never was, nor ever will be, a place of Trade; it is so mountainous a Territory, that little provision can be had by land...”​[136]​ Sir William Temple believed that the commercial potential of Tangier remained rich, but contended that, rather than persist with a pattern of misrule, the only viable strategy was to have it “blown into the air, or otherwise reduced to its first chaos,” lest it should “fall into the hands either of the Turk or Spaniard.”​[137]​ The tenor of these arguments began to inform a wider Whig discourse outside parliament. One letter conceived for circulation through opposition ranks - issued purportedly from within the merchant community in Hamburg but strikingly mimetic of William Love’s Commons rhetoric - mocked the “vaine expectations... chimeras & promises” that had sanctioned English governance of the city. Failing to draw off the commerce of Spanish ports , the vaunted “free port” had attracted only the “thieves,” “pickpocketts” and pirates of Barbary, so that it now resembled less a flourishing emporium than an inn furnished to “entertaine highwaymen.” The bolder vision of Tangier as the seat of a North African empire was damned as “flight of romantick fancy” worthy of “Don quixot’s adventures,” and a dream that threatened to dissolve in “English blood,” when the Moroccans had already proved their ability to bring thousands of men into the field against the territorial pretensions of Portugal and Spain. The Hamburg merchant believed that a catalogue of “tricks and frauds” offered up by men with financial interests in Tangier, had deluded the English nation into pouring precious resources into a “contemptible hole,” a burden wisely discarded by the house of Braganza, “to lay it on our backs.”​[138]​
The full extent of polarisation over foreign policy was made apparent, however, when Whigs began to develop the argument that military adventures in Barbary represented a deadly distraction from other bonds, obligations, and national interests. The Hamburg letter continued: “wee are as jealous of the increaseing Grandure of some European kings, as others of our own European neighbours, and consequently are not a little troubled to find the King of England diverted from preventing it,” by using the finest vessels in the navy “merely as scarecrows to fight Pyrats” in the Straits.​[139]​ In Parliament too, imperial delusions were critiqued for seducing the court into neglecting the truly urgent challenge being visited upon the nation. Sir William Temple lamented that, “by our own conduct, we have not made ourselves fit for what God has appointed us.” He clarified that it was “not the consideration of Tangier” that stirred his thoughts, but “the deplorable State of the Protestants Abroad,” to whom the greatest peril was posed not by the emperor of Morocco, but the king of France. Temple believed “It is our Fortune to sit here in a critical Time, when not only the Affairs of this Nation, but the Protestant Religion abroad need our Countenance.”sedcvuAgainst such a background, the elevation of Tangier over the competing demand to defend the “liberties of Europe” could, for Whigs, arise only from the same sinister source that had contaminated the English domestic realm. “Popish and French counsels,” William Love believed, “put the King upon these vast expences ... as they have done in the war with Algiers, on purpose to impoverish the Nation.”​[140]​ In 1679, concern for continental allies provided the lens through which critics of the court looked upon the wider world. The earl of Shaftesbury believed that no imperial venture could be pursued through neglect of “the foreign Protestants,” who stood as “the only wall and defence to England; upon it you may build palaces of silver.”​[141]​ Sir William Jones could concede that “Tangier is a place of great moment, but I take the preservation of Religion to be far greater...”​[142]​ More bluntly, Ralph Montagu averred: “I had rather see the Moors in Tangier, than the Pope in England.”​[143]​ The temper of global politics was shifting, and, for the court’s opponents, these changes raised demands for solidarity with the United Provinces, the German states and even the anti-French Austrian empire above the needs of a crumbling garrison in the Mediterranean.​[144]​ 
If Tangier had elicited the most urgent expressions of dissent, the focus of the opposition extended across the global frontiers of the Stuarts’ Empire, to frame the case that imperial despotism was imperilling the liberties of the domestic realm. John Bland’s son Giles, had acted as London agent for the dissident counties in Virginia estranged by “French despotick methods” detected in the rule of Governor William Berkeley. In 1676, the younger Bland crossed the Atlantic to take up rebellious arms under Nathaniel Bacon: he was executed, reputedly on the personal orders of the duke of York, and the family’s plantations made forfeit to the Crown.​[145]​ Fears for the liberties of New England entered similarly into the imagination of the Exclusionists, when William Love, Thomas Player and their coevals on the London Common Council maintained a web of personal and professional connections to local magistrates resisting the crown’s push to remodel the Massachusetts Bay charter in the interests of greater metropolitan control. According to royal agents in Boston, it was the “correspondence between the factious parties in Old and New England,” and “the many scandalous papers sent here,” that made provincial opponents so “daringly presume” of the king’s enfeeblement.​[146]​ While most of their broadsides were levelled against the practises of the empire, urging the king to abandon dreams of further conquests, and recuperate the pacific “free port” model, Whig polemic in and outside the chamber exposed the court’s aspirations to a wider well of ideological criticism, unearthing old economic and humanitarian objections lodged against the Roman or Spanish models of world dominion. The case against Tangier drew upon a corpus of “Country” pamphlets that assimilated civic humanist anxieties with contemporary precepts of political economy. “It concerns the English... not to waste men in large and unprofitable Territories, which hath ruin’d the Spaniard,” the barrister Carew Reynell had argued, but to concentrate instead on the quieter and more rewarding improvement of domestic agriculture and manufacturing.​[147]​ The Hamburg letter agreed that it was not merely in Tangier but across “our Westerne Collonys,” that the English had over-reached themselves, sacrificing a greater quantity of bullion and manpower “then Consistes with policy or profitt for the nation.”​[148]​ 
By 1680, attacks upon Tangier had become the mouthpiece for a revived critique of some of the principal facets of English imperialism, nourished on deep roots within Puritan and Republican thought, and now riveted onto the strategic conflict awakened by the ambitions of Louis XIV. As Hugh Cholmley recalled, critics of the court argued that belief in the importance of attaining maritime dominion rested on an outdated view of the world, when “Spain was already in a low condition, and under such necessities of a friendship with England, as made farther dependence needless...”​[149]​ For William Love, the danger had been anticipated as early as 1640 by the king’s opponents in the Long Parliament, who had counselled against a foreign policy dependent on the Navy as extending to the wider world nothing more than “a forearm to beg with.” The Hamburg letter turned to the writings of the City republican Slingsby Bethel and traced the national delusion back to Oliver Cromwell’s Western Design, when the private interests of Caribbean traders had stirred a blinkered Elizabethan nostalgia, inveigling the Protectoral Council away from the emerging reality that France, not the court of Madrid, had become the prime national adversary.​[150]​ Returning to print in 1680, Bethel himself called upon Charles II to cease “coveting foreign conquests,” establish himself instead as the “head of the Protestant party” and restore “the balance of Europe” against the king in Versailles.​[151]​ The case against Stuart imperialism laid down the contours of Whig thought on questions of foreign policy, and the beleaguered state of English interests in the Mediterranean would be judged against the relentless primacy of the continental battle against universal monarchy. As William Love concluded, “when we have Confederates to destroy the power of France, we shall have no need of Tangier.”​[152]​

		V.
While the Exclusionists sought to turn English eyes away from the Empire, the Tory, loyalist defenders of the court threw themselves behind the cause of Tangier, hailing the city as indispensable to the dignity of English monarchy and the greatness of the kingdom. For Joseph Williamson, it would be “criminal” to advise severance from the Straits, for Edward Seymour, “I think Tangiers of such importance that it will be the last thing in the World that the King will part with.”​[153]​ The defenders offered point-by-point engagement with Whig arguments. Seymour claimed that it was erroneous to expect dominions overseas to be subject to the same constitutional bars that constrained royal authority at home, since “many things in the Government of Tangier are not applicable to the Law of England.”​[154]​ The marquis of Halifax attacked what he saw as the tendentious reasoning in parliament that rampant Catholicism in Tangier made its funding too dangerous to acquiesce: “It is hard they should expect the world should believe them in this, when it is certain they do not believe themselves.” By March 1681, one London agent of the duke of Ormond reported that the defence of Tangier had become one of three central components of the loyalist case, proclaimed alongside the security of the kingdom at home, and discovery of the truth behind the “popish plot”, as the duties incumbent upon English government, against the Whig frivolity of “falling on the single forbidden fruit of the Bill [of Exclusion].”​[155]​ In Westminster, the king’s defenders invoked the city in a bid to sway wavering opinions: Lord Halifax indeed identified a critical moment that tipped his sympathies away from the opposition as the point when “they were asked what should be done with Tangier, to answer with Popery and a Remonstrance.”​[156]​ The advocates for Tangier matched their opponents by lodging their case within the larger public domain. Within months of the debate in the chamber, the fortunes of Englishmen in the Straits were being brought to the forefront of loyal addresses, pamphlets and poems, many published by the royal printer Henry Hills, and entering into the households of anxious followers of the Tory cause, such as Sir Daniel Fleming in Westmorland and the Catholic Sir Robert Throckmorton in Warwickshire.​[157]​ Among the most widely circulated works was Henry Sheres’s 1680 Discourse touching Tangier, a paean to an imperial “Jewel of so many extraordinary virtues... so peculiar to the use and service of the English Nation.”​[158]​ The Whigs’ Hamburg correspondent warned that this text was “much banded about amongst us,” and possessed, he feared, the craft to sway “the Ignorant Gazett reader” into thinking the city “the Elixer Vite of the Nation.”​[159]​
Between 1679 and 1682, while the Exclusion Crisis raged through the body politic, the condition of Tangier was turned into ammunition in a pamphlet war, as Whigs and Tories moved towards irreconcilable conceptions of the national interest. From the defenders, heroic narratives describing every Moorish assault acclaimed “English valour” against “proud Affricks threats,” and made clear that to abandon the city would be to betray “the honour of our Nation that have with small numbers made the now haughty Nations bow and yield...”​[160]​ By June 1680, as the London preacher Roger Morrice recorded, loyal peers were clustering before the king to “offer themselves as voluntiers” for the Mediterranean.​[161]​ The playwright Elkanah Settle, who had dramatised the themes of Lancelot Addison’s West Barbary for the London stage as The Empress of Morocco in 1673, announced his shift in allegiance to the Tory camp with an Heroick Poem, published to bewail the misfortunes of a city “betrayed” by the “apostate faithless Christians” and “falling traitors” of the parliamentary opposition.​[162]​ That Tangier had gained a totemic place in Tory literature was confirmed by the end of the year, when Sir Palmes Fairborne was given a monument in Westminster Abbey after his death in a cavalry charge against the besieging forces, with an epitaph by John Dryden carved into the stone.​[163]​ The city’s proponents began to intervene in larger debates, contesting the strategic and ideological premises of Whig policy. Henry Sheres believed that the best check upon the “overgrowing greatness” of any European power lay not in exhaustive continental land wars, but maintaining the “darling Priviledge and Prerogative of our Dominion upon the Sea.”​[164]​ Even if Louis XIV was the most serious threat to the realm, “embroyling us with Faction and Schism in this Critical Season does not only give the French King an Opportunity, but an Invitation to Seize the Booty,” thundered Roger L’Estrange’s Observator.​[165]​ Together these arguments crafted a defence of Tangier that resuscitated a Cavalier ethic of patriotic honour and duty, and enabled the king’s supporters to strike a popular chord in opposition to Whig zeal. “Tangers, the nation’s right, the peace of Christendome’: such the Catholic courtier John Lytcott, reported from London, were the talismanic features of a case fashioned to “turne our gentlemen of this Citty” against the “clamore of the fanaticks”.​[166]​ 
These exchanges refashioned the approved public image of Tangier. Increasingly, the irenic, commercial ideal voiced in 1660 was being supplanted by the heroic, militantly Christian manifesto for imperial expansion proffered first by James Wilson. For Hugh Cholmley, Tangier should be defended as a scourge… to curb the faithless heads of the men of Algiers,” enabling England to set up a bulwark against “a considerable part of the Ottoman Empire.”​[167]​ With the Turkish advance towards Vienna beginning to command attention in English newsbooks and pamphlets, defenders of Tangier sought to confront Whig invocations of the European Protestant conscience with a rival confessional narrative.​[168]​ Henry Sheres, collaborating with Samuel Pepys over the creation of a public narrative for the city, captured an elemental struggle, fought out by those who should be “cherish’d and consider’d at home... who have drawn their Swords, and serv’d their King and Country, against the Enemies of our Religion, and of God himself.”​[169]​ Appropriating memories of Jerusalem, Lepanto and Constantinople, Cholmley and Sheres depicted the English empire in the Mediterranean as a blow struck for Christendom, driving “infidells” back from North Africa.​[170]​ For Dryden, the death of Fairborne bore the mark of “martyr’s glory.”​[171]​ From this perspective, it was the Exclusionists who could be accused of splitting the Christian world, their obsession with the Catholic presence in Tangier deflecting English minds from a more urgent international cause. Events within the Mediterranean indeed animated a growing trend in Tory literature in which Whigs and Dissenters were captured as akin to the men of Barbary themselves: Puritans and Moors alike having “maintained their conquests,” in Cholmley’s words, by “an abominable hypocrisy and shew of saintship imposed upon the credulous multitude.”​[172]​ The argument proved irresistible in loyalist print. For one poet, “those that did Design and Laugh/ At Tangiers, in Distress/ were Phanaticks worse by half/ Than all the Moors in Fez.”​[173]​
Yet though its proponents ransacked every justification, secular and religious, the failure to acquire additional funding made the preservation of Tangier an increasingly remote possibility. “What therefore will become of us God only knows,” Sheres agonised to Samuel Pepys. “Our Taper is burnt to the Sockett, and unless speedy matter be ministered it must goe out.”​[174]​ The earl of Ossory, commissioned to follow Inchiquin as governor, died of a fever in September 1680 before he could set sail, raving in delirium, according to John Evelyn, against a king, “who resolving to send him with an incompetent force... [was] willing to cast him away upon not onely an hazardous Adventure, but in most men’s opinions, Impossible.”​[175]​ As late as 1682, nonetheless, the fall of Tangier did not appear inevitable. The long siege of 1680 had been lifted, and the king was able to buy time by raising extra revenue from the Dublin parliament.​[176]​ In January 1682, an unexpectedly-harmonious Moroccan embassy framed terms for a treaty, should the English confine their settlements to a commercial port situated within the old city walls.​[177]​ But the instability brought down upon the three kingdoms was testing the faith even of the most fulsome court advocates for Tangier. In assenting to the payments from Dublin, the duke of Ormonde offered the caveat that “the security of Ireland is preferable even before the security of Tangier. If they can both be provided for, well and good; but if one be abandoned, the choice is easy.”​[178]​ Domestic upheavals had undermined in particular the voice of the duke of York, hitherto the main cheerleader for the city at court, and Samuel Pepys doubted “whether [he] himself be now strong enough to mend things... without exposing himself to more envy and complaint among the friends of the rogues he should punish...”​[179]​ Confronted with these pressures, sensibilities within the court were starting to shift. Recalled to London in September 1682, the temporary governor Colonel Edward Sackville agonised that “I have used all ye arguments I am master of both to ye king himself & ye ministers of ye considerableness of ye place & how prejudiciall ye want of it will prove to ye Crowne,” yet to no avail.​[180]​ In January 1683, when diplomatic relations with Moulay Ismail broke down again, the prospect of another war pushed royal confidence finally to breaking point. 
As early as 1679, the duke of Ormonde had predicted that though Charles “loved Tangier well he loved himself better.”​[181]​ In August 1683, in the face of Portuguese protests that England was preparing to abandon “Christian territory”, the needs of royal self-preservation were indeed finally put before the glories of empire.​[182]​ Loyal voices in England fumed that the fatal blow had been struck not by Moorish arms, but betrayal in parliament: by “the restless designs of ill-affected subjects... the general subversion of all peace and order in the government,” as Pepys perceived it.​[183]​ To Hugh Cholmley, all the hopes imposed upon the city could never surmount the “fearfull” disposition evidenced in Westminster towards the prospect of “his Majtie’s growing rich”.​[184]​ A more nuanced perspective emerged within English diplomatic ranks. To Sir Robert Southwell, “it would cost 4 millions to make that Place tenable, and then a standing Garrison of 8,000 men”: a burden now unthinkable, “so exhausted we are by our present discontents”.​[185]​ Plagued by skilful opponents and growing debts, the city could survive only by mobilising overwhelming domestic consensus. In February 1684, the night of explosions that brought an end to English Tangier confirmed that the dream of a North African empire had failed to implant itself sufficiently within the national soul.

VI.
In later years, the fortunes of English Tangier became caught up within the bitterly contested narratives that looked back on the reign of Charles II, and interrogated the chain of events seen to culminate in the 1688 Revolution. In 1689, William Sherlock suggested that were it not for the mania of the Whig party, “the important Fortress of Tangier had been still in our hands,” adding that “the lower House knew the importance of that place very well when they set the Bill of Exclusion upon its head.”​[186]​ Defensive reflections on the city gave vent not merely to Tory polemic, but Jacobite disaffection. One of the medley of fictional, chivalric exiles presented in the poetry of the Catholic émigré Jane Barker was introduced as “Tangerine,” a gentleman soldier who had proved his valour in defence of a “renowned city... shamefully betrayed by His Majesty’s enemies.”​[187]​ John Dryden delivered his thinly-veiled lament for James II, Don Sebastian, through a reflection on a failed Christian expedition into North Africa, with the valour of a pious prince thwarted by the renegades coaxed by self-interest into the Moorish armies.​[188]​ The city held no less potent a place in Whig mythology. In his memoirs, Gilbert Burnet damned the king’s choice of Tangier over Dunkirk as culpable for the peril of French universal monarchy: “the Damage we have suffered from it since, has the Bargain often reflected on with Severity at home.”​[189]​ Burnet recalled that Colonel Percy Kirke, one of the most notorious hands raised against the Monmouth rebels in 1685, had held command in the Mediterranean only two years earlier; the attack upon Francis Nicholson by the Virginia clergy showed similarly how a background in Tangier could cast blight over a military reputation.​[190]​ Many of these critiques drew upon a fear, dramatised in contemporary literature, that the reach of an imperial power beyond Christendom carried dangers of moral contamination.​[191]​ While several leading officers resurrected their careers under William III, Tangier veterans from New York to Bermuda would be accused of having absorbed despotic and oriental habits from their time in the Straits: in Kirke’s case, even of pledging conversion to Islam.​[192]​ When England returned to the region in 1713, with the absorption of Gibraltar, contemporary discourse recalled the reputation of Tangier as the incubus for imperial misrule, and affirmed the place of “Barbary captivity” as a leitmotif in Whig polemic. The wisdom to be prised out of North Africa was not, according to one author, that Mediterranean settlements were doomed to fail, but that no colony anywhere could feasibly persist when its existence proved “destructive both to our Liberties and Religion.”​[193]​
Although it had been marginal to the legal and economic structures of the late Stuart Empire, Tangier stood at the centre of contemporary debates over imperialism, a laboratory for the rival confessional, classical and commercial languages through which commentators meditated on the meaning of global dominion. Its example did not resolve but intensified debates over the type of empire that the kingdom ought to possess, over the role to be played by the crown, and the extent to which England could differentiate herself from her conquering rivals on the continent. The dispute kindled over the merits of a network of free ports or an empire of conquest extended across America and the Caribbean and, in political debate, into the later part of the eighteenth century, as English administrators fretted over the conundrum of how to build an empire “agreeable to the Laws of Nations, the Principles of Christianity, and the Constant Maxims of the British Nation...”​[194]​ This question gave continuing life to the notion that strategically-chosen islands and isthmuses could stand as alternatives to major territorial engrossment, even if the logic was to take settlers into deeply vulnerable locations. Fifteen years after the fall of Tangier, William Paterson would impose upon the Isthmus of Panama, or Darien, the same language projected onto the Mediterranean, vaunting “the Door of the Seas and the Key of the Universe,” whose possession could crown a nation as “Arbitrators of the Commercial World.”​[195]​ Yet failure at Tangier, as, latterly, at Darien, left the vision of imperium through emporium increasingly challenged by the argument for fuller territorial enlargement: the case expressed by Hugh Cholmley, that “more land would be our greatest profit, likeliest expedient in time to lessen ye publick charge”, and prevent a colony being forced for ever to “depend upon ye care of England to keep it from starving...”​[196]​ As these discussions moved from private counsels into a wider public domain, the commercial and strategic overtones could never be held separate from deeper moral, religious and cultural questions engendered by the experience of empire. 
The merchants, soldiers and civilians of the early empire were not just local actors responding to parochial circumstances, but individuals operating in the shadow of debates at once national, European and global. Their experiences at Tangier dramatised tensions at the heart of English national identity, probing the question of whether the Catholic or the Islamic threat offered the supreme command upon the public conscience; of whether affinities towards a greater Christendom transcended the particular needs of the Protestant cause. In exposing these fissures, the development of an empire represented not merely the reflection of a political mood within England; it could be an active instrument in the creation of new divides, the medium through which conflicting views of the world evolved. For the court, Tangier had been the fulcrum of a plan to slant English foreign policy away from obligations in Europe towards an alternative national destiny, anchored on an oceanic grand strategy, and, increasingly, proclaimed through the rhetoric of Christian warfare. Pitched against the parliamentary conflict brewing over fears of corruption, Catholicism, and tyranny, this plan was found wanting, and the resultant debate showed how the imperial and Protestant identities maintained within the British kingdoms could pull in very different directions.
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